Posts Tagged ‘Georgia’

Swarms of Russian jets bomb Georgian targets

TBILISI, Georgia – Swarms of Russian jets launched new raids on Georgian territory Monday and Georgia faced the threat of a second front of fighting as Russia demanded that Georgia disarm troops near the breakaway province of Abkhazia.

While a senior Russian general insisted that Russia has no plans to press further into Georgian territory — its troops are now in two breakaway provinces — the order to disarm carried the threat that Russian-sponsored fighting would spread.

The new air forays into Georgia – even as Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili on signed a cease-fire pledge — appeared to show Russian determination to subdue the small, U.S.-backed country, which has been pressing for NATO membership. Russia fended off a wave of international calls to observe Georgia’s pleas for a truce, saying it must first be assured of Georgia’s retreat from South Ossetia.

READ FULL STORY>>>

What are the real loss of the Russian army in Georgia?

As a result of fighting in the Tskhinvali region of Russia’s 58 army has lost 1,789 soldiers, 105 tanks and 81 fighting vehicles, 45 armored personnel carriers, 10 devices “Grad” and 5 devices “Smerch”.

Such data led agency “MediaNews”.

According to MediaNews information, these figures reflect a loss of only 58 army. Unknown losses remain Pskov and Novorossiyskoy landing divisions, as this data is particularly Russia FSB secret.

And give figures on losses of South Ossetia: “destroyed 8 – percent militias criminal regime of Eduard Kokoity”, said the message. Of the 500 fighters of the South Ossetia fighting squad – tshinvali-riot policemen left alive only five people.

Putin is fasten the noose around Georgia’s neck

Putin

First of all, i want to apologize for the style of this article.
This is a translation form russian. But i really think it worth to publish, even with this far from perfect translation.

——–

This in the morning again in the USSR have appeared not only ossets. Back in USSR following categories of citizens could feel: other inhabitants of Georgia; ‘ national minorities ‘, for example, Chechens; the West; besides Russian to which now should live with the state, the device and which political ideology has ominous similarity to Soviet Union. Russia ambitious greedy militarists correct, and they are excited not too with borders of their sovereignty.

Did they got lucky or not – a question separate.

Last years the Russian state has distinguished the following. First, it has undergone to quite proved charges in murder of the citizen lived in London in exile. Secondly, it expropriated the foreign investment capital, operating on behalf of the raw company which itself and supervised. Thirdly, it helped separatists with neighbouring countries to destabilize independence recently received by neighbours.

And recently Russia has finally decided to cease to behave well, has started to bomb the independent state – Georgia – and has entered there armies.

Some from the set forth above actions were made under covering of maintenance of observance of the tax laws or ‘ peace-making activity ‘. Conversations about ‘ democracies ‘ is too no more than covering: in fact all authority and all of money in the country more and more concentrate in hands of prime minister Vladimir Putin and other siloviki (former workers of prospecting services). It is necessary to tell, that siloviki not bad are able to select at people the property, but here to create values they are not able, therefore generally they squander selected then they should select something.

The similar system паразитирования with advantage has been copied in ‘ broken away ‘ regions of Georgia which the Kremlin has ostensibly taken under the protection. Almost all officials in ‘ the government ‘ South Ossetia – former workers of KGB from various regions of Russia. So, ‘ Minister of Internal Affairs ‘ earlier served in the Ministry of Internal Affairs of North Ossetia. Julia Latynina from ‘ the New newspaper ‘ caustically notices: ‘ South Ossetia is not territory, not the country and not a mode. This joint venture of generals with the ossetic bandits, used for extraction of profit from war with Georgia ‘.

In other words, it is the pity, sparsely populated reloading point, living drug-dealing, contraband, money-laundering and other criminal crafts.

Besides supply силовиков money, South Ossetia has one more purpose – to destabilize a situation in westernized Georgia. At regular intervals firing at nearby Georgian villages, ossets have provoked Georgian president Michael Saakashvili to retaliation military operation which, similar, will terminate catastrophically.

But if Georgia stayed idle, Russia one step at a time would include region in structure of the territory. Putin has already distributed to residents of South Ossetia the Russian passports. Result one: extension of the Russian expansion, revenge of Georgia for the courageous union with the West and annexation of South Ossetia (now in it peacemakers ‘ manage Russian ‘).

Here so, guys. Back in USSR – and in any way differently.

Whether mister Putin present перекройкой borders will be satisfied? Last at night the Russian tanks have entered on territory actually Georgia. Whether it will continue to cripple the country? Whether it will block the unique pipeline in the world on which the Central Asian oil arrives at the West without transit through territory of Russia? And if will block, whether it will descend to it from hands?

In Moscow, apparently, believe, that they will manage to give out impudent capture of another’s territory for ‘ peacekeeping ‘ the operation, called to stop ‘ a genocide ‘ and ‘ ethnic cleanings ‘, ostensibly carried out Georgians. This is actively popularized during mass PR-campaign in Russia and on a world scene. Originally this нарратив even has found supporters in the environment of those people from the point of view of which any opposed George Bush or against his allies inevitably appears right.

So, many approved, that the recognition mister n was the answer to a recognition of independence of Kosovo the United States America and the European Union. Russia, however, helps separatists sixteen years. It is in that case found out, that before us the unique case which is not having precedents in history of mankind, namely: consequence precedes the reason in time.

Other attempt to soften the antiRussian rhetoric became the application that Саакашвили has andered mister Putin, having wished to enter NATO. The given argument is practical application put forward by philosopher Roger Scruton a postulate, that ‘ defense is equivalent to an attack ‘.

Actually events of the last week have shown only that Saakashvili was right, looking for protection against the Russian aggression. If membership in the NATO of Georgia has been given, in the Kremlin once again would reflect, it is necessary to them to attack Georgia or not.

The rattling mix skilful PR-campaign in the Russian mass-media and cultural мазохизма to the western public basically could lead to that the West would swallow capture of South Ossetia by Russia and even Abkhazia, – business would manage pair formal protests then the parties would return to conducting the affairs in a usual mode. The similar script even now is not represented improbable – the German society is especially hard amazed by pacifism – but there are three arguments against a policy of appeasement.

The first is a kind of the Russian tanks, with a roar moving on the Georgian territory. Thirty-year anniversary of an attack to Czechoslovakia has wakened old memory of atrocities of Soviet Union. The second is that tanks have not stopped on border of separative regions, and have continued movement on territory actually Georgia. This circumstance substantially disavows ‘ peacekeeping ‘ the version of events and does inconvenient carrying out of border between an event and naked agression – such, as, for example, aggression of 1968 against Czechoslovakia. Thirdly, member states of an EU and the NATO earlier was satellites of the USSR, constantly lobby the active defensive policy concerning Russia. On Saturday Poland and the Baltics both international organizations have in common called to condemn the Russian aggression.

But how the West with condemnation can act? Russia has overwhelming strategic advantage in region. Hardly probable not the greatest the western diplomats can achieve that, is ‘ repeated freezing ‘ the conflict along those borders which will satisfy aspiration of Russia to keep the клептократические enclaves, and a conclusion of the Russian armies from the basic part of the Georgian territory. How promptly Russia develops the success, the similar arrangement will be to seem, perhaps, achievement.

But in the long-term period all looks a little differently. If Russia turns to similarity of the USSR, means, the West should defend built after the termination ‘ cold war ‘ the international system and to protect the former communistic countries from neoimperialist Putin.

The direct gain of Georgia will lead new ‘ to cold war ‘ and to economic sanctions from the West. Besides danger will proceed and from the Russia as all Caucasian region is astable, and the Russian army more and more depends on inflow of recruits from among Chechens and other national minorities. The similar combination of conditions can terminate in accident for Moscow. We shall recollect, for example, Afghanistan.

But also less resolute actions from Russia can cause the serious answer in political area. So, the countries of the Central Europe disturbed by the Georgian crisis quite can immediately agree with the project of antimissile defense to which mister Putin resists. In this case the attack to Georgia will turn back against it. If membership in the NATO once again is will be offered to Georgia, it attempt to brake will prove, that process of its introduction into an alliance, on the contrary, will promote its acceleration. The similar offer can be made and Ukraine as to Georgia Kiev considers an attack as the prevention, addressed to it. At last, the West can aggravate adverse economic consequences of inclusion of South Ossetia in structure of Russia, having refused to recognize южноосетинские passports equivalent Russian and inflicted other trading sanctions. Then the Kremlin should look into poor, explosive and desperately demanding money a province.

It is better to hold more serious economic sanctions in a stock. Similar measures effectively act as threat, instead of as a reality. The West can declare, that violent actions from Russia will lead to introduction of economic sanctions, since exception from ‘ a G-8 ‘. Russia with its rapidly decreasing population, huge dependence on power resources and sharp demand for the western investments and the markets simply should apprehend similar threat seriously.

Certainly, Russia too can enter own economic sanctions – to stop deliveries of energy carriers, to ship the Europe in darkness. But time at them is such trump, it is better to learn to us about it too early, than too late.

Original source is here: http://inosmi.ru/stories/06/06/13/3482/243252.html

The War We Don’t Know

By Mark Ames
Five days after Georgia invaded and seized the breakaway separatist region of South Ossetia, sparking a larger-scale Russian invasion to drive Georgian forces back and punish their leaders, Russia surprised its Western detractors by calling a halt to the country’s offensive. After all, the mainstream media, egged on by hawkish neocon pundits and their candidate John McCain, had everyone believing that Russia was hellbent on the full-scale annihilation and annexation of democratic Georgia.

But then came Tuesday’s cease-fire announcement–and we’re now forced to ask ourselves serious questions about the recent conflict: what really started it, how dangerous was it and what, with serious careful consideration, could be done to prevent it from turning into a worst-case scenario? Up until now, this war was framed as a simple tale of Good Helpless Democratic Guy Georgia versus Bad Savage Fascist Guy Russia. In fact, it is far more complex than this, morally and historically. Then there are two concentric David and Goliath narratives here. The initial war pitted the Goliath Georgia–a nation of 4.4 million, with vastly superior numbers, equipment and training thanks to US and Israeli advisers–against David-Ossetia, with a population of between 50,000-70,000 and a local militia force that is barely battalion strength. Reports coming out of South Ossetia tell of Georgian rockets and artillery leveling every building in the capital city, Tskhinvali, and of Georgian troops lobbing grenades into bomb shelters and basements sheltering women and children. Although true casualty figures are hard to come by, reports that up to 2,000 Ossetians, mostly civilians, were killed are certainly believable, given the intensity of the initial Georgian bombardment, the wanton destruction of the city and surrounding regions and the generally savage nature of Caucasus warfare, a very personal game where old rules apply.

But you don’t hear about this story from the Western media. Indeed, you hear little if anything about the Ossetians, who seem to hardly exist in the West’s eyes, even though their grievance is the root cause of this war.

While Russia and America see the conflict in abstract terms about spheres of influence and protecting allies, for Ossetians, who still recall the centuries of massacres Georgians committed against them, it is highly personal. They will still recall the Georgian massacres in the early 1920s, when Georgia was briefly independent, which exterminated up to 8 percent of the Ossetian population. In 1990, when Georgia was again moving towards independence, the ultranationalist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia abolished Ossetia’s limited autonomy, leading to another Ossetian rebellion that was only quelled by a peace agreement signed by Georgia, Russia and the Ossetians. Gamsakhurdia was subsequently deposed, and Georgia’s ethnic chauvinism was shelved until the rise of current president Mikhail Saakashvili in 2003.

Ossetians have traditionally relied on their powerful northern neighbor Russia for protection against Georgia. The Georgians, in turn, have tried to counter Russian hegemony, for which they are no match, by aligning closely with the United States, finding friendly ears among old cold warriors and Bush-era neocons.

When he first rose to prominence, the American-educated Saakashvili was often referred to as “Georgia’s Vladimir Zhirinovsky”–the Russian ultranationalist firebrand who once promised to retake Alaska. Although Saakashvili was subsequently rebranded as a Euro-democrat, he promised to reunite Georgia and bring his separatist regions to heel, by force if necessary, whether the aggrieved ethnic groups liked it or not.

At the root of this conflict is a clash of two twentieth-century guiding principles in international relations. Georgia, backed by the West, is claiming its right as a sovereign nation to control the territory within its borders, a guiding principle since World War II. The Ossetians are claiming their right to self-determination, a guiding principle since World War I.

These two guiding concepts for international relations–national sovereignty and the right to self-determination–are locked in a zero-sum battle in Georgia. Sometimes, the West takes the side of national sovereignty, as it is in the current war; other times, it sides with self-determination and redrawing of national borders, such as with Kosovo.

In that 1999 war, the United States led a nearly three-month bombing campaign of Serbia in order to rescue a beleaguered minority, the Albanians, and carve out a new nation. Self-determination trumped national sovereignty, over the objections of Russia, China and numerous other countries.

Why, Russians and Ossetians (not to mention separatist Abkhazians in Georgia’s western region) ask, should the same principle not be applied to them?

The answer is clear: because we say so. That sort of logic, in an era of colossal American decline and simultaneous Russian resurgence, no longer works on the field.

But sadly, this news hasn’t been conveyed to neocon hawks like Robert Kagan or to John McCain, who seem to still be living in 2002, when American military power was seen as the answer to all the world’s problems. There is even evidence to suggest that America encouraged Saakashvili to think he could solve this conflict by war. Ever since 2002, when American Green Berets dropped into Georgia to train its troops against phantom Al Qaeda cells, the Bush Administration has drawn the former Soviet nation closer into what appeared to be a military alliance, culminating in Georgia’s 2,000-man contribution to the Iraq coalition forces (the third-largest contingent), and American joint training exercises in July, just a few weeks before Georgia’s blitzkrieg attack on South Ossetia. In the UN, Russian attempts in the early hours of the war to pass a resolution calling for a cease-fire were shot down by American and British diplomats, who objected to the clause calling on both sides to “renounce violence”–exactly Saakashvili’s position.

The question we must ask is: Are we willing to risk war, including nuclear holocaust, in order to fulfill the aspirations of Mikhail Saakashvili? While Bush and McCain speak of Saakashvili as if he’s a combination of Thomas Jefferson and Nelson Mandela, he’s seen by his own people as increasingly authoritarian and unbalanced. Last year, Saakashvili sent in his special forces to violently disperse opposition protesters in the capital city, followed by a declaration of martial law. He sacked the opposition television station (partly owned by Rupert Murdoch), exiled or jailed his political opponents, and stacked the courts with his own judges while removing neutral observers, leaving even onetime neocon cheerleaders like Bruce Jackson and Anne Applebaum feeling queasy. Hardly the image of the “small democratic nation” that everyone today touts.

The Russian response has, of course, been disproportionate and heavy-handed–exactly what’s to be expected of them ever since Boris Yeltsin first showed the world how post-Soviet Russia fights its wars, starting with Chechnya in 1994. Georgia has been terrorized by indiscriminate aerial bombing and the constant threat of invasion by a vastly superior Russian force–eerily reminiscent of NATO’s campaign against Serbia in 1999. Indeed, many observers believe that the current Russian response is a direct blowback of the Kosovo campaign, which is why there are so many similarities.

But what is the best way to respond? The neocons and even CNN reports talk about exploring military options, which is absurd given the consequences of war with nuclear-armed Russia. Woofing loudly like John McCain is likely to prove as effective as Bush’s woofing did with North Korea, before he was forced to crawl back to the negotiating table.

In fact, one of the most effective ways America could respond to this crisis is by rethinking its entire geopolitical approach of the past two decades, which has been hegemonic, arrogant, hypocritical and reckless. If we set a better example, then we could at least reclaim the moral authority, or “soft power,” that we once had.

Instead, we’ve left the world other more brutal lessons about geopolitical power and how to use it, and the Russians are showing they’ve learned from us well. One lesson they learned from Kosovo is that when you bomb a petty nationalist leader like Saakashvili or Milosevic, eventually–when the cease-fire is called and the sense of defeat settles in–the nationalist firebrand who brought them to defeat pays with his seat in power.

About Mark Ames

Mark Ames is the editor of Moscow’s alternative paper The eXile. He is the author of Going Postal: Rage, Murder and Rebellion From Reagan’s Workplaces to Clinton’s Columbine and Beyond (Soft Skull) and The eXile: Sex, Drugs and Libel in the New Russia (Grove).

Original Source